Bayesian: MAIB report finds stability limits were not known to the crew
Bayesian was vulnerable to particularly strong gusts even with her sails lowered, but this condition had not been identified in the approved stability information available to the crew. This is one of the main conclusions of the final report published on 19 November by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB). The MAIB is the UK body that investigated the sinking of the 56-metre sailing yacht built by Perini Navi, which went down off Porticello, Sicily, on 19 August 2024 with the loss of seven lives.
The report confirms a technical point that PressMare had already raised in August and again on 13 November. The stability documentation was approved in 2008 under the British LY2 code. It included heeling limit curves for sailing, but no equivalent guidance for the motoring configuration, with sails lowered and the keel raised. This is a routine operating condition for a yacht of this type, yet its stability limits in strong winds had not been adequately documented. The analyses commissioned by the MAIB were already outlined in the interim report of May 2025. For the configuration assumed at the time of the sinking, they put the angle of vanishing stability at 70.6 degrees. In the same model, a beam gust of more than 63.4 knots would have been enough to capsize the yacht. Three factors had a significant effect on how the yacht responded to aerodynamic loads on the rig and superstructure: the position of the lifting keel, the displacement and the apparent wind angle.
According to the British reconstruction, Bayesian was struck by a violent downburst. This is a descending air current associated with a thunderstorm that can generate gusts of exceptional strength. The anchor began to drag at around 03:57, and at 04:06 the yacht was knocked down to starboard, heeling beyond 90 degrees in less than 15 seconds. Unable to right herself, she took on water and sank in a depth of about 50 metres. The loss of stability therefore came before the flooding. The distinction matters because it separates what caused the knockdown from what followed while the yacht lay on her side, when water ingress made the situation irreversible.
The MAIB also notes that the available weather forecasts indicated the possibility of thunderstorms but did not specifically warn of a downburst. An exceptionally violent phenomenon, forecasts with little detail and no guidance on stability limits all reduced the crew’s ability to assess the risk correctly. The speed at which the event developed made this even harder.
The British findings come as Italy waits for the technical report commissioned by the Termini Imerese Public Prosecutor’s Office, which is due to be filed by the end of the month. PressMare reported on 13 November that, according to advance information from Adnkronos, the experts are inclined to attribute the sinking to the conduct of the crew and to rule out design errors. This has yet to be checked against the official document. The MAIB report does not apportion criminal liability, and the vulnerability it identifies is not in itself a design defect. The British investigation is aimed at prevention. The Italian inquiry will have to establish which precautions could reasonably have been expected of the crew, and whether different actions would have prevented the sinking.
The question raised by PressMare therefore remains central: what information was available on board to assess the risks with the keel raised, and what stability margins would a different keel position have provided? It concerns both the conduct of the crew and the documentation supplied by the designer and approved by the competent bodies. The MAIB has recommended that the Red Ensign Group assess the vulnerabilities identified and, where necessary, update the Yacht Code and its associated guidance. Other recommendations cover the training of masters, how extreme weather is represented in forecasting services, and nautical publications. The case therefore opens a discussion that goes beyond Bayesian, about whether stability assessments for large sailing yachts are adequate when no sail is set. The issue involves designers, certification bodies, flag administrations and masters, and it could shape future safety criteria for this category of yacht.